In the lead-up to tomorrow’s inauguration, Enrique Peña Nieto and his Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party—PRI) have crafted a number of legislative proposals they hope will set the tone for his six years in Mexico’s highest office. Three key initiatives are now pending debate before the lower chamber.
First is an initiative to fold the nation’s Secretaría de Seguridad Pública (Public Security Secretariat—SSP) into the interior ministry. Second is a move to strengthen the nation’s Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información(Federal Institute for Access to Public Information—IFAI). And third is an initiative to create a national anti-corruption commission.
According to Peña Nieto’s transition team, national security and public safety need higher central authority. Analysts note that under Presidents Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), SSP ran roughshod over the government, many times trampling over the attorney general and ignoring human and procedural rights. Examples often cited are the televised capture of French kidnapper Florence Cassez, which caused a deluge of human rights complains against the SSP and strained Mexico’s relationship with France, and the unexplained September shooting of two U.S. Central Intelligence Agency agents outside Mexico City by Mexican Federal Police.
After last month’s mass elections, Mexico is buzzing. Will second-place Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) of the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution—PRD) take to the streets should the nation’s highest electoral court, the Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación (TEPJF), fail to invalidate July’s presidential vote as a result of alleged voter fraud? Will the victorious Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party—PRI) return to its old ways? And what will ever happen to the outgoing Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party—PAN)?
An angry President Felipe Calderón summoned a number of PAN party leaders to Los Pinos for a series of meetings the week after the election. Everyone, except the party’s presidential candidate Josefina Vázquez Mota, received a mouthful from the president—with the most severe reserved for private secretary Roberto Zuarth, who ran Vázquez Mota’s failed campaign, and state governor Marco Adame whose political operation failed to prevent the PRD from taking the executive’s seat in the state of Morelos. Calderón also suggested that party president Gustavo Madero resign to allow for a rebirth of the party. It was this last suggestion that caused an intense and divisive internal battle between Maderistas and Calderonistas for power over the PAN. The battle includes naming rights over the PAN’s leader slots in the deputies and senate chambers when the new congress forms on September 1, as well as overall agenda-setting and decision-making over who keeps a job at PAN headquarters.
Calderón and Madero have never seen eye-to-eye. Madero considers the president worn-out, intrusive, a micro-manager, stubborn and the main reason the PAN lost the presidency. Calderón, on the other hand, blames Madero for the PAN’s loss and wants the party to continue pushing his social and anti-narco policies well after he leaves office. Both have taken to the road, meeting with state and local PAN leaders. Calderón asks for Madero’s head; and Madero asks members to respect party statute, which stipulates a vote for new party leadership no earlier than May 2013. It remains unlikely the 300-member National Council will hold a vote before the legal date, but it is not entirely impossible. At the height of power, Calderón expelled party president Manuel Espino from party ranks for “excessive use of freedom of speech”—Espino weighed against Calderón during primaries in 2006 and heavily criticized the president in books and interviews—and replaced party presidents and executive leadership in three separate occasions.
Mexican Senator María de los Ángeles Moreno of Mexico’s Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) party proposed on Tuesday the establishment of Mexico City as a “Federal City,” replacing the position of head of government with that of a mayor and 17 elected city council members.
The constitutional modifications would give residents of the Federal District more voting power and increase the city’s autonomy, though its name and status as the nation’s capital would not change. The City Legislative Assembly, for example, would approve Mexico City’s debt, rather than the National Congress. Ángeles Moreno said the new mayor would be a more visible, authoritative position than the current head of government, similar to the mayors of New York, Madrid or Washington. Her proposal would also divide the city into 20 municipal territories, rather than the current 16. The proposal is now being reviewed by the upper house’s Commission on Mexico City.
While the legislature considered structural reforms for the city, several senior members of the Barack Obama administration, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, were also in the Mexican capital on Tuesday to unveil a $331 million plan focused on civilian police training as part of a new approach to U.S.-Mexican counter-narcotics strategy.
Mexican politics are frustratingly fascinating.
This seems like a paradox, but then again, so does our history as a modern state. With presidential elections 2.5 years away, unlikely candidates and alliances are already beginning to form. This leaving me wondering if this country has any recollection of the political roads we’ve traveled and the costs they’ve instilled on us.
Let’s retrace our steps for a minute. The Mexican Revolution that started 100 years ago was supposed to set the basis for a system, which would alleviate the poverty gap, provide better worker conditions and at the very least, treat citizens with respect and provide the political rights that people lacked.
But this complex era in Mexican history resulted in what Luis Aboites Aguilar called (in a very politically-correct manner) “a political arrangement which made stability possible in the long term.” Along came the time of the PRIismo, an authoritarian regime with a masked one-party system run by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). As they had with Diaz, once again Mexicans deposited their trust in a strong presidential figure who fed them with the possibility of a better tomorrow.